Text of Democratic Socialist Party Memo

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Tue Nov 11 21:59:24 MST 2003






Text of the Democrat Memo



We have carefully reviewed our options under the rules and believe we
have identified the best approach. Our plan is as follows:
1) Pull the majority along as far as we can on issues that may lead to
major new disclosures regarding improper or questionable conduct by
administration officials. We are having some success in that regard. For
example, in addition to the president's State of the Union speech, the
chairman has agreed to look at the activities of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense as well as Secretary Bolton's office at the State
Department. The fact that the chairman supports our investigations into
these offices and co-signs our requests for information is helpful and
potentially crucial. We don't know what we will find but our prospects
for getting the access we seek is far greater when we have the backing of
the majority. (Note: we can verbally mention some of the intriguing leads
we are pursuing.)
2) Assiduously prepare Democratic "additional views" to attach to any
interim or final reports the committee may release. Committee rules
provide this opportunity and we intend to take full advantage of it. In
that regard, we have already compiled all the public statements on Iraq
made by senior administration officials. We will identify the most
exaggerated claims and contrast them with the intelligence estimates that
have since been declassified. Our additional views will also, among other
things, castigate the majority for seeking to limit the scope of the
inquiry. The Democrats will then be in a strong position to reopen the
question of establishing an independent commission (i.e. the Corzine
amendment).
3) Prepare to launch an independent investigation when it becomes clear
we have exhausted the opportunity to usefully collaborate with the
majority. We can pull the trigger on an independent investigation at any
time-- but we can only do so once. The best time to do so will probably
be next year either:
A) After we have already released our additional views on an interim
report -- thereby providing as many as three opportunities to make our
case to the public: 1) additional views on the interim report; 2)
announcement of our independent investigation; and 3) additional views on
the final investigation; or
B) Once we identify solid leads the majority does not want to pursue. We
could attract more coverage and have greater credibility in that context
than one in which we simply launch an independent investigation based on
principled but vague notions regarding the "use" of intelligence. In the
meantime, even without a specifically authorized independent
investigation, we continue to act independently when we encounter
foot-dragging on the part of the majority. For example, the FBI Niger
investigation was done solely at the request of the vice chairman; we
have independently submitted written questions to DoD; and we are
preparing further independent requests for information.
Summary
Intelligence issues are clearly secondary to the public's concern
regarding the insurgency in Iraq. Yet, we have an important role to play
in the revealing the misleading -- if not flagrantly dishonest methods
and motives -- of the senior administration officials who made the case
for a unilateral, preemptive war. The approach outline above seems to
offer the best prospect for exposing the administration's dubious motives
and methods.
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