[Rushtalk] Boeing 737 MAX groundings

Carl Spitzer {C Juno} cwsiv at juno.com
Tue Oct 15 08:40:18 MDT 2019

Boeing 737 MAX groundings

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Global grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX 

  Boeing 737 MAX grounded aircraft
 near Boeing Field, April 2019.jpg
A parking lot at Boeing Field in
Seattle, Washington, filled with
undelivered Boeing 737 MAX aircraft
      * Lion Air accident: October
        29, 2018
      * Ethiopian Airlines accident:
        March 10, 2019
      * First grounding:
        March 10, 2019 (2019-03-10)
        by Ethiopian Airlines
      * Effectively a worldwide
        March 13, 2019 (2019-03-13)
        by the Federal Aviation
        Administration (FAA)
Ongoing. 7 months and 5 days (since
March 10, 2019)
Precautionary measure following two
similar crashes less than five
months apart

      * 189 on Lion Air Flight 610
      * 157 on Ethiopian Airlines
        Flight 302

In March 2019, aviation authorities and airlines around the world
grounded the Boeing 737 MAX passenger airliner after two MAX 8 aircraft
crashed, killing all 346 people aboard. The accidents befell Lion Air
Flight 610 on October 29, 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on
March 10, 2019. Ethiopian Airlines reacted first, grounding its MAX
fleet effective the day of its accident. On March 11, China's Civil
Aviation Administration ordered the first regulatory grounding, and most
other agencies and airlines followed suit over the next two days. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initially reaffirmed the
airplane's airworthiness on March 11, but grounded it on March 13. The
groundings affected 387 MAX aircraft delivered to 59 airlines.

In each accident, a unique automated flight control feature known as
MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) repeatedly sent
the aircraft into a dive. Pilots faced multiple alarms when erroneous
angle of attack (AoA) information activated the MCAS. A few minutes
after takeoff, each aircraft crashed at high speed with the nose pointed

MCAS was never described in airplane manuals nor in crew training prior
to the first accident. In November 2018, Boeing issued a service
bulletin directing pilots' attention to an existing procedure to recover
from "runaway trim". The FAA followed up with an emergency airworthiness
directive. Boeing began implementing changes to the MCAS software,
flight control computer system and cockpit displays. In April 2019, a
month after the Ethiopian airlines accident, Boeing admitted that MCAS
was activated in both accidents. In May, Boeing revealed that an AoA
disagree alert was inoperative on most aircraft, but claimed that it
provided supplementary information and did not affect aircraft safety.

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Congress, and a technical
team from nine countries launched investigations into the MAX's type
certification, particularly whether the process had been compromised by
excessive delegation of FAA's authority to Boeing. In September 2019,
the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) faulted Boeing's
assumptions that any pilot could diagnose MCAS activation and, within a
few seconds, execute the procedure amid confusing cockpit warnings. The
Joint Authorities Technical team faulted the FAA's incomplete
understanding of MCAS, including how the aircraft might perform without
it. The review found deficiencies in the system safety analysis, as it
had not considered how human factors interplayed with automation, and
was based on an earlier, less aggressive version of MCAS.

Airlines canceled thousands of flights and leased other aircraft to fill
in for the MAX. Boeing suspended deliveries and reduced production of
the airliner; it might halt manufacturing temporarily if recertification
is delayed beyond October 2019.[importance?] As of September 2019, the
grounding cost Boeing up to $8 billion in revenue and compensation to
airlines and bereaved families. Boeing faced lawsuits from pilots for
lost wages and from victims' families, who alleged Boeing concealed
flaws in the airplane.

      * 1 Accidents 
              * 1.1 Lion Air Flight 610
              * 1.2 Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302
      * 2 Groundings 
              * 2.1 Impact on airborne flights 
                      * 2.1.1 Upon groundings
                      * 2.1.2 During groundings
              * 2.2 Regulators
              * 2.3 Airlines
      * 3 Accident investigations 
              * 3.1 Indonesia
              * 3.2 Ethiopia
              * 3.3 United States
              * 3.4 Singapore
              * 3.5 Australia
              * 3.6 France
      * 4 Avionics analysis 
              * 4.1 Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
              * 4.2 Angle of attack sensor system architecture 
                      * 4.2.1 Angle of attack display
                      * 4.2.2 Angle-of-Attack Disagree alert
              * 4.3 Flight computer architecture 
                      * 4.3.1 Microprocessor
                      * 4.3.2 Redundancy
      * 5 Type rating and training needs 
              * 5.1 Crew manuals, pilot training and simulators 
                      * 5.1.1 Runaway stabilizer trim procedure
      * 6 Certification inquiries 
              * 6.1 Congress
              * 6.2 Joint Authorities Technical Review
              * 6.3 Office of Special Counsel investigation
      * 7 Reactions 
              * 7.1 Aircraft manufacturers 
                      * 7.1.1 Boeing 
                              * Accidents and grounding
                              * Investigation feedback
                              * Corporate structure and new
                                safety practices
                              * Key positions
                              * Current and former employees
                      * 7.1.2 Airbus
              * 7.2 Operators and professionals 
                      * 7.2.1 Airlines
                      * 7.2.2 Flight crew
                      * 7.2.3 Experts
              * 7.3 Others 
                      * 7.3.1 Consumer advocates
                      * 7.3.2 Public
                      * 7.3.3 Academia
                      * 7.3.4 News media
                      * 7.3.5 Politicians
      * 8 Financial impact 
              * 8.1 Airlines
              * 8.2 Litigation
              * 8.3 Orders
              * 8.4 Boeing's financial results
              * 8.5 Suppliers
              * 8.6 Aviation insurance
      * 9 Return to service 
              * 9.1 Aviation authorities 
                      * 9.1.1 Federal Aviation Administration
                      * 9.1.2 European Aviation Safety Agency
              * 9.2 Engineering and certification activities for
                avionics update 
                      * 9.2.1 Flight tests
                      * 9.2.2 Safety reviews
              * 9.3 Projections 
                      * 9.3.1 Boeing
                      * 9.3.2 Airlines
                      * 9.3.3 Regulators
      * 10 See also
      * 11 References
      * 12 External links


Main articles: Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302

Lion Air Flight 610[edit]

PK-LQP, the aircraft involved in the crash of Flight 610
On October 29, 2018, Indonesian Lion Air Flight 610 from Soekarno–Hatta
International Airport in Jakarta to Depati Amir Airport in Pangkal
Pinang crashed into the Java Sea 12 minutes after takeoff. All 189
passengers and crew were killed in the accident.[1][2][3] The
preliminary report tentatively attributed the accident to the erroneous
angle-of-attack data and automatic nose-down trim commanded by
MCAS.[4][5] The defective angle-of-attack vane was a "dubious" used part
that had been replaced on the captain's side.[6] The 737 MAX aircraft
was delivered 2 months and 16 days prior, on August 13, 2018. This is
the deadliest crash involving the Boeing 737 regardless of variant.[7] 

Boeing published a supplementary service bulletin addressing the AoA
warning and the pitch system's potential for repeated activation, all
without referring to MCAS by name. The bulletin describes warnings
triggered by erroneous AoA data, and referred pilots to a "non-normal
runaway trim" procedure as resolution, specifying a narrow window of a
few seconds before the system's next application.[8] The FAA issued an
Emergency airworthiness directive 2018-23-51, requiring the bulletin's
inclusion in the flight manuals, and that pilots immediately review the
new information provided.[9][10]

Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302[edit]

ET-AVJ, the Ethiopian Airlines aircraft that crashed as Flight 302
On March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 from Addis Ababa in
Ethiopia to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, Kenya,
crashed six minutes after takeoff near Bishoftu, killing all 157
passengers and crew aboard the aircraft.[11][12][12][13][14] The 737 MAX
was delivered 3 months and 23 days prior, on November 15, 2018, two
weeks after the Lion Air accident.[15]

Initial reports indicated that the Flight 302 pilot struggled to control
the airplane, in a manner similar to the circumstances of the Lion Air
crash.[16] A stabilizer trim jackscrew found in the wreckage was set to
put the aircraft into a dive.[17] Experts suggested this evidence
further pointed to MCAS as at fault in the crash.[18][19] After the
crash of flight ET302, Ethiopian Airlines spokesman Biniyam Demssie said
in an interview that the procedures for disabling the MCAS were just
previously incorporated into pilot training. "All the pilots flying the
MAX received the training after the Indonesia crash," he said. "There
was a directive by Boeing, so they took that training."[20] Despite
following the procedure, the pilots could not recover.[21] 

Vertical airspeeds of Boeing Max 737s in 2018-2019 crashes

The vertical airspeeds of the Boeing 737 MAX 8s involved in the JT 610
and ET 302 crashes
Ethiopia's transportation minister, Dagmawit Moges, said that initial
data from the recovered flight data recorder of Ethiopian Flight 302
shows "clear similarities" with the crash of Lion Air Flight
610.[22][23] However, the main cause of the accidents is still under
investigation and not yet fully determined.


     Grounded by government regulator
     Voluntarily grounded by all operating airlines
Ethiopian Airlines grounded its fleet on March 10.[24] The Civil
Aviation Administration of China ordered all MAX aircraft grounded in
the country on March 11, stating its zero tolerance policy and the
similarities of the crashes. Most other regulators and airlines
individually grounded their fleets in the next two days.[24][25][26][27]

On March 11, the FAA issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to
the International Community (CANIC) for operators. The CANIC set out the
activities the FAA had completed after the Lion Air accident in support
of continued operations of the MAX and listed the 59 affected operators
of 387 MAX aircraft around the world.[28][29][30]

On March 13, Canada received new information suggesting similarity
between the crashes in Ethiopia and Indonesia. Canadian Transport
Minister Marc Garneau informed U.S. Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao
of his decision to ground the aircraft. Hours later, President Trump
announced U.S. groundings, following consultation among Chao, acting FAA
administrator Daniel Elwell and Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg. The FAA
issued an official grounding order, citing the new evidence and
acknowledging the "possibility of a shared cause for the two
incidents".[31][32] The U.S., Canadian, and Chinese regulators oversee a
combined fleet of 196 aircraft, more than half of all 387 airplanes

Impact on airborne flights[edit]

Upon groundings[edit]

About 30 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft were flying in U.S. airspace when the
FAA grounding order was announced. The airplanes were allowed to
continue to their destinations and were then grounded.[34] In Europe,
several flights were diverted when grounding orders were issued.[35][36]
For example, an Israel-bound Norwegian 737 MAX aircraft returned to
Stockholm, and two Turkish Airlines MAX aircraft flying to Britain, one
to Gatwick Airport south of London and the other to Birmingham, turned
around and flew back to Turkey.[37][38]

During groundings[edit]

On June 11, Norwegian Flight DY8922 attempted a ferry flight from
Málaga, Spain to Stockholm, Sweden. Such flights can only be flown by
pilots meeting a certain European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
qualification, and with no other cabin crew or passengers. The flight
plan contained specific parameters to avoid MCAS intervention, flying at
lower altitude than normal with flaps extended, and autopilot on.[39]
However, the aircraft was refused entry into German airspace, and
diverted to Châlons Vatry, France.[40][41]

In a rare exemption, Transport Canada approved 11 flights in August and
September, partly to maintain the qualifications of senior Air Canada
training pilots, because the airline has no earlier-generation 737s
within its fleet. The airline used the MAX during planned maintenance
movements, and ultimately flew it to Pinal Airpark in Arizona for

To prepare for ferry flights of its five MAX 8s for winter storage in
the milder climate of Toulouse, France, Icelandair pilots trained in a
flight simulator. Scheduled for early October, the aircraft will have
the wing flaps out as little as possible and will fly at a lower than
usual speed and at an altitude not exceeding 20,000 feet, resulting in
the flights taking two hours longer than normal.[43] The Directorate
General for Civil Aviation demanded that the flights avoid urban


Boeing 737 MAX 8s of Shenzhen Airlines grounded at Shenzhen Bao'an
International Airport in March 2019
Although regulators typically follow guidance from the plane maker and
its national certifying authority, in this case they cited safety
precautions as reason to ground the aircraft, and revoked clearance of
MAX aircraft from foreign airlines despite the lack of guidance from
Boeing and the Continued Airworthiness Notification from the FAA.[45]

    Regulator grounding timeline
March 11
China's Civil Aviation
Indonesia's Ministry of
March 12
Australia's Civil Aviation Safety
Austria's Ministry of Transport[51]
Belgium's Federal Public Service
Mobility and Transport[52]
Bermuda's Civil Aviation
Cayman Islands' Civil Aviation
Equatorial Guinea's Civil Aviation
European Union's Aviation Safety
Fiji's Civil Aviation Authority[57]
France's Directorate General for
Civil Aviation[58]
Germany's Federal Ministry of
Transport and Digital
India's Directorate General of Civil
Aviation (DGCA)[60]
Greece's Civil Aviation
Ireland's Aviation [62]
Italy's Civil Aviation Authority[63]
Malaysia's Civil Aviation
Netherlands' Human Environment and
Transport Inspectorate[66][67]
Oman's Directorate General of Civil
Aviation and Meteorology[68]
Poland's Civil Aviation
Portugal's National Institute of
Civil Aviation[70]
Romania's Civil Aeronautical
Singapore's Civil Aviation
United Arab Emirates' General Civil
Aviation Authority[73]
United Kingdom's Civil Aviation
Vietnam's Civil Aviation
March 13
Albania's Civil Aviation
Armenia's General Department of
Civil Aviation[77]
Bangladesh's Civil Aviation
Brazil's National Civil Aviation
Brunei's Department of Civil
Bulgaria's Civil Aviation
Transport Canada Civil Aviation
Chile's Directorate General of Civil
Colombia's Special Administrative
Unit of Civil Aeronautics[84]
Costa Rica's Dirección General de
Aviación Civil[85]
Cyprus' Department of Civil
Denmark's Transport Authority[87]
Djibouti's Civil Aviation
Egypt's Ministry of Civil
Georgia's Civil Aviation
Hong Kong's Civil Aviation
Iraq's Civil Aviation Authority[92]
Israel's Civil Aviation
Jamaica's Civil Aviation
Kosovo's Civil Aviation
Kuwait's Directorate General of
Civil Aviation[96]
Lebanon's Civil Aviation
Macau's Civil Aviation Authority[98]
Moldova's Civil Aviation
Montenegro's Civil Aviation
Namibia's Civil Aviation
New Zealand's Civil Aviation
Nigeria's Civil Aviation
North Macedonia's Civil Aviation
Panama's Civil Aviation
Senegal's Agence Nationale de
l'Aviation Civile et de la
Seychelles' Civil Aviation
Thailand's Civil Aviation
Trinidad and Tobago's Civil Aviation
Turkey's Ministry of Transport and
Ukraine's State Aviation
United States' Federal Aviation
Uzbekistan's Civil Aviation
March 14
Belarus' Department for
Bosnia and Herzegovina's Directorate
of Civil Aviation[115]
Ethiopia's Civil Aviation
Gabon's Agence Nationale de
l'Aviation Civile[117]
Japan's Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and
Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation
Kiribati's Ministry of Information,
Communications, Transport and
Tourism Development[120]
Mexico's Directorate General of
Civil Aeronautics[121]
Papua New Guinea's Civil Aviation
Russia's Federal Air Transport
Rwanda's Civil Aviation
Serbia's Civil Aviation
South Korea's Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport[126]
Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics
March 15
Guatemala's Dirección General de
Aeronáutica Civil[129]
Iran's Civil Aviation
Paraguay's Dirección Nacional de
March 16
Argentina's National Civil Aviation
March 18
Algeria's Directorate of Civil
Aviation and Meteorology[133]
Uruguay's National Civil Aviation
and Aviation Infrastructure
     1. ^ Covers the European Union
        and the European Free Trade
        Association members
     2. ^ Taiwan CAA announced
        airspace closures similar to
        Japan, stating that the FAA
        grounding would affect all

      * March 11 
              * China: The Civil Aviation Administration of China orders
                all domestic airlines to suspend operations of all 737
                MAX 8 aircraft by 18:00 local time (10:00 GMT), pending
                the results of the investigation, thus grounding all 96
                Boeing 737 MAX planes (c. 25% of all delivered) in
              * United States: The FAA issued an affirmation of the
                continued airworthiness of the 737 MAX.[135] As many
                airlines and regulators began grounding the MAX, the FAA
                issued a "continued airworthiness notification", stating
                that it had no evidence from the crashes to justify
                regulatory action against the aircraft.[136]
              * Indonesia: Nine hours after China's grounding,[137] the
                Indonesian Ministry of Transportation issued a temporary
                suspension on the operation of all eleven 737 MAX 8
                aircraft in Indonesia. A nationwide inspection on the
                type was expected to take place on March 12[138] to
                "ensure that aircraft operating in Indonesia are in an
                airworthy condition".[139]
              * Mongolia: Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia (MCAA)
                said in a statement "MCAA has temporarily stopped the
                737 MAX flight operated by MIAT Mongolian Airlines from
                March 11, 2019."[140]
      * March 12 
              * Singapore: the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore,
                "temporarily suspends" operation of all variants of the
                737 MAX aircraft into and out of Singapore.[72]
              * India: Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA)
                released a statement "DGCA has taken the decision to
                ground the 737 MAX aircraft immediately, pursuant to new
              * Turkey: Turkish Civil Aviation Authority suspended
                flights of 737 MAX 8 and 9 type aircraft being operated
                by Turkish companies in Turkey, and stated that they are
                also reviewing the possibility of closing the country's
                airspace for the same.[142]
              * South Korea: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and
                Transport (MOLIT) advised Eastar Jet, the only airline
                of South Korea to possess Boeing 737 MAX aircraft to
                ground their models,[143] and three days later issued a
                NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) message to block all Boeing 737
                MAX models from landing and departing from all domestic
              * Europe: The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
                suspended all flight operations of all 737-8 MAX and
                737-9 MAX in Europe. In addition, EASA published a
                Safety Directive, published at 18:23,[145] effective as
                of 19:00 UTC, suspending all commercial flights
                performed by third-country operators into, within or out
                of the EU of the above mentioned models[56] The reasons
                invoked include:[145] 
                        Technical decision, data driven, precautionary
                        measure: Similarities with the Lion Air accident
                        data; Application of EASA guidance material for
                        taking corrective actions in case of potential
                        unsafe conditions; Additional considerations: no
                        direct access to the investigation, unusual
                        scenario of a "young" aircraft experiencing 2
                        fatal accidents in less than 6 months.
                        — Paytrick Ky, director
              * Canada: Minister of Transport Marc Garneau said it was
                premature to consider groundings and that, "If I had to
                fly somewhere on that type of aircraft today, I
              * Australia: The Civil Aviation Safety Authority banned
                Boeing 737 MAX from Australian airspace.[147]
              * Malaysia: The Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia
                suspended the operations of the Boeing 737 Max 8
                aircraft flying to or from Malaysia and transiting in
      * March 13 
              * Canada: Minister of Transport Marc Garneau, prompted by
                receipt of new information,[149] said "There can't be
                any MAX 8 or MAX 9 flying into, out of or across
                Canada", effectively grounding all 737 MAX aircraft in
                Canadian airspace.[150][151]
              * United States: President Donald Trump announced on March
                13, that United States authorities would ground all 737
                MAX 8 and MAX 9 aircraft in the United States.[152][153]
                After the President's announcement, the FAA officially
                ordered the grounding of all 737 MAX 8 and 9 operated by
                U.S. airlines or in the United States airspace.[112] The
                FAA did allow airlines to make ferry flights without
                passengers or flight attendants in order to reposition
                the aircraft in central locations.[154][155]
              * Hong Kong: The Civil Aviation Department banned the
                operation of all 737 Max aircraft into, out of and over
                Hong Kong.[156]
              * Panama: The Civil Aviation Authority grounded its
              * Vietnam: The Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam banned
                Boeing 737 MAX aircraft from flying over Vietnam.[159]
              * New Zealand: The Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand
                suspended Boeing 737 MAX aircraft from its
              * Mexico: Mexico's civil aviation authority suspended
                flights by Boeing 737 MAX 8 and MAX 9 aircraft in and
                out of the country.[161]
              * Brazil: The National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC)
                suspended the 737 MAX 8 aircraft from flying.[162]
              * Colombia: Colombia's civil aviation authority banned
                Boeing 737 MAX 8 planes from flying over its
              * Chile: The Directorate General of Civil Aviation banned
                Boeing 737 MAX 8 flights in the country's airspace.[164]
              * Trinidad and Tobago: The Director General of Civil
                Aviation banned Boeing 737 Max 8 and 9 planes from use
                in civil aviation operations within and over Trinidad
                and Tobago.[165]
      * March 14 
              * Taiwan: The Civil Aeronautics Administration banned
                Boeing 737 Max from entering, leaving or flying over
              * Japan: Japan's transport ministry banned flights by
                Boeing 737 MAX 8 and 9 aircraft from its airspace.[166]
      * March 16 
              * Argentina: The National Civil Aviation Administration
                (ANAC) closed airspace to Boeing 737 MAX flights.[167]


See also: List of Boeing 737 MAX orders and deliveries
After the Ethiopian Airlines crash, some airlines proactively grounded
their fleets and regulatory bodies grounded the others. (This list
includes MAX aircraft that have powered on their transponders, but may
not yet have been delivered to an airline. Some pre-delivered aircraft
are located at Boeing Field, Renton Municipal Airport and Paine Field

   Airline groundings
timeline and fleet size
       Fleet size
March 10
Ethiopian Airlines[24]
March 11
Air China
Cayman Airways[170]
China Eastern Airlines
China Southern Airlines
Eastar Jet
Fuzhou Airlines
Garuda Indonesia
Gol Transportes
Hainan Airlines
Kunming Airlines
Lion Air
Lucky Air
MIAT Mongolian
Okay Airways
Royal Air Maroc[175]
Shandong Airlines
Shanghai Airlines
Shenzhen Airlines
March 12
9 Air
Air Italy
Corendon Airlines
Enter Air
Fiji Airways
Jet Airways[179]
LOT Polish Airlines[180]
Mauritania Airlines[181]
Norwegian Air
Norwegian Air Shuttle
Norwegian Air Sweden
S7 Airlines[183]
Sunwing Airlines[184]
TUI Airways
TUI fly Belgium
TUI fly Netherlands[66]
TUI fly Nordic
Turkish Airlines[142]
March 13
Air Canada[185]
American Airlines
Copa Airlines[186][158]
Southwest Airlines
SCAT Airlines
Thai Lion Air
United Airlines
March 15
Oman Air[188]
Samoa Airways
TUI fly Deutschland

Accident investigations[edit]

Per the Convention on International Civil Aviation, if an aircraft
of a contracting State has an accident or incident
in another contracting State, the State where the accident occurs will
institute an inquiry. The Convention defines the rights and
responsibilities of the states. 

ICAO Annex 13—Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation—defines which
States may participate in an investigation, for example: the States
of Occurrence, Registry, Operator, Design and Manufacture.[189]

The investigating countries or participating ones mentioned below are
member of the Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) with exception
of Ethiopia, which delegates the main investigation to France, a member
of EASA. Particularly Australia and Singapore expressed interest shortly
after the first 737 MAX accident by offering support to Indonesia.


In August 2019, leaked copies of the unreleased[190] National
Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) report in circulation listed
design and oversight lapses playing a key role in the Lion Air Flight
610 crash. The draft conclusions also identify pilot and maintenance
errors as causal factors among a hundred elements of the crash
chronology, without ranking them.[191][192] Lion Air expressed
objections because NTSC's latest draft, according to a source,
attributes 25 lapses to Lion Air out of 41 lapses found.[193]


The Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA)'s Accident Prevention and
Investigation Bureau, which cited similarities between both accidents in
its preliminary report for Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, collaborated
investigation efforts with Indonesian NTSC and Transportation Ministry

United States[edit]

On October 31, 2018, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and
an engineering team from Boeing arrived in Indonesia to assist with the
Lion Air accident investigation led by the NTSC.[196]

On September 26, 2019, the NTSB released the results of its review of
potential lapses in the design and approval of the 737
MAX.[197][198](p1)[199] The NTSB concluded that the assumptions that
Boeing used in its functional hazard assessment of uncommanded MCAS
function for the 737 MAX did not adequately consider and account for the
impact that multiple flight deck alerts and indications could have on
pilots' responses to the hazard[198][200].

The flight deck interface for alerts could be improved so as to minimize
crew errors, according to the report.[201] "For example, the erroneous
AOA output experienced during the two accident flights resulted in
multiple alerts and indications to the flight crews, yet the crews
lacked tools to identify the most effective response. Thus, it is
important that system interactions and the flight deck interface be
designed to help direct pilots to the highest priority action(s)."[198]

The NTSB also questions the long-held industry and FAA practice of
assuming the nearly instantaneous responses of highly trained test
pilots as opposed to pilots of all levels of experience to verify human
factors in aircraft safety.[202]

The NTSB urges the FAA to take action on the safety recommendations in
its report. It is concerned that the process used to evaluate the
original design needs improvement because that process is still in use
to certify current and future aircraft and system designs. The FAA could
for example randomly sample pools from the worldwide pilot community to
get a more representative assessment of cockpit situations.[203]

The NTSB report highlights the incomplete validation of the functional
hazard assessment, with potentially confusing indications in the
cockpit: "Thus, the specific failure modes that could lead to unintended
MCAS activation (such as an erroneous high AOA input to the MCAS) were
not simulated as part of these functional hazard assessment validation
tests. As a result, additional flight deck effects (such as IAS DISAGREE
and ALT DISAGREE alerts and stick shaker activation) resulting from the
same underlying failure (for example, erroneous AOA) were not simulated
and were not in the stabilizer trim safety assessment report reviewed by
the NTSB."[198]


Singapore's Transport Safety Investigation Bureau (TSIB) sent a team to
assist in the search for Lion Air Flight 610's flight recorders, after
NTSC of Indonesia accepted their offer. The TSIB support consisted of a
team of three specialists and an underwater locator beacon detector to
assist with the search. The team arrived in Jakarta on the evening of
October 29, 2018.[204]


The Australian Transport Safety Bureau sent two of its personnel to
assist the Indonesian NTSC with the downloading process of the FDR.


The French Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety
(BEA), which handled the investigation of Air France Flight 447
announced they would analyze the flight recorders from Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302. The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident
Investigation, being unable to decode the flight recorders on the 737
MAX, declined a prior request.[205] BEA received the flight recorders on
March 14, 2019.[206]

Avionics analysis[edit]

Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System[edit]

Main article: Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System

The tracking data of Lion Air Flight 610 from Flightradar24
The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight
control law was introduced on the 737 MAX to mitigate the aircraft's
tendency to pitch up because of the aerodynamic effect of its larger,
and heavier, and more powerful CFM LEAP-1B engines and nacelles. The
stated goal of MCAS, according to Boeing, was to make the 737 MAX
perform similarly to its immediate predecessor, the 737 Next Generation.
The FAA and Boeing both refuted media reports describing MCAS as an
anti-stall system, which Boeing asserted it is distinctly
not.[207][208][209] The aircraft had to perform well in a low-speed
stall test.[210]

Investigators suspect that MCAS was triggered by falsely high angle of
attack (AoA) inputs, as if the plane had pitched up excessively. On both
flights, shortly after takeoff, MCAS repeatedly actuated the horizontal
stabilizer trim motor to push down the airplane
nose.[211][212][213][214] Satellite data for the flights, ET 302 and JT
610, showed that the planes struggled to gain altitude.[215] Pilots
reported difficulty controlling the airplane and asked to return to the
airport.[153][216] On April 4, 2019 Boeing publicly acknowledged that
MCAS played a role in both accidents.[217] 

After the Lion Air crash, Boeing told airlines that MCAS could not be
overcome by pulling back on the control column to stop a runaway trim as
on previous generation 737s. [218] Nevertheless, confusion continued:
the safety committee of a major U.S. airline misled its pilots by
telling that the MCAS could be overcome by "applying opposite
control-column input to activate the column cutout switches".[219]
Former pilot and CBS aviation & safety expert "Sully" Sullenberger
testified, "The logic was that when MCAS was activated, it had to be,
and must not be prevented."[220]

On March 11, 2019, after China had grounded the aircraft,[221] Boeing
published some details of new system requirements for the MCAS software
and for the cockpit displays, which it began implementing in the wake of
the prior accident five months earlier:[211]

      * If the two AOA sensors disagree with the flaps retracted, MCAS
        will not activate and an indicator will alert the pilots.
      * If MCAS is activated in non-normal conditions, it will only
        "provide one input for each elevated AOA event."
      * Flight crew will be able to counteract MCAS by pulling back on
        the column.

On March 27, Daniel Elwell, the acting administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), testified before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, saying that on January 21,
"Boeing submitted a proposed MCAS software enhancement to the FAA for
certification. ... the FAA has tested this enhancement to the 737 MAX
flight control system in both the simulator and the aircraft. The
testing, which was conducted by FAA flight test engineers and flight
test pilots, included aerodynamic stall situations and recovery
procedures."[222] After a series of delays, the updated MCAS software
was released to the FAA in May 2019.[223][224] On May 16, Boeing
announced that the completed software update was awaiting approval from
the FAA.[225][226] The flight software underwent 360 hours of testing on
207 flights.[227] Boeing also updated existing crew procedures.[211] The
implementation of MCAS has been found to disrupt autopilot operations.

Angle of attack sensor system architecture[edit]

The Angle of Attack sensors measure an aircraft's pitch relative to
oncoming winds. Though there are two sensors, only one of them is used
at a time to trigger MCAS activation on the 737 MAX. The angle of attack
system is not robust to the failure of a single AoA sensor, thus
activating MCAS under a single point of failure.[220] Redundancy is a
technique that may be used to achieve the quantitative safety
requirements per recognized development practices of aircraft systems,
such as ARP4754.[229] The sensors themselves are under scrutiny. Sensors
on the Lion air aircraft were supplied by United Technologies' Rosemount

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has KC-46 Pegasus aerial refueling tankers on
order, which is based on a Boeing 767. MCAS, as designed on the KC-46,
compares both sensors, and allows pilots to retake control of the

In September 2019, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) said
it prefers triple-redundant Angle of Attack sensors rather than the dual
redundancy in Boeing's proposed upgrade to the MAX.[233] Installation of
a third sensor could be expensive and take a long time. The change, if
mandated, could be extended to thousands of older model 737s in service
around the world.[233]

Angle of attack display[edit]

The primary flight display of a Boeing 737-800 aircraft with a
functional angle of attack display on the upper right; the AoA Disagree
alert would appear as a text message.
In 1996, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued Safety
Recommendation A-96-094. 

        transport-category aircraft present pilots with angle-of-attack
        info in a visual format, and that all air carriers train their
        pilots to use the info to obtain maximum possible airplane climb

The NTSB also stated about another accident in 1997, that "a display of
angle of attack on the flight deck would have maintained the
flightcrew's awareness of the stall condition and it would have provided
direct indication of the pitch attitudes required for recovery
throughout the attempted stall recovery sequence." The NTSB also
believed that the accident may have been prevented if a direct
indication of AoA was presented to the flightcrew (NTSB,

Boeing published an article in Aero magazine about AoA systems,
Operational use of Angle of Attack on modern commercial jet planes:
"Angle of attack (AOA) is an aerodynamic parameter that is key to
understanding the limits of airplane performance. Recent accidents and
incidents have resulted in new flight crew training programs, which in
turn have raised interest in AOA in commercial aviation. Awareness of
AOA is vitally important as the airplane nears stall. [...] The AOA
indicator can be used to assist with unreliable airspeed indications as
a result of blocked pitot or static ports and may provide additional
situation and configuration awareness to the flight crew."[235]

Boeing announced a change in policy in the Frequently Asked Questions in
a (FAQ) about the MAX corrective work, "With the software update,
customers are not charged for the AOA disagree feature or their
selection of the AOA indicator option."[236]

Angle-of-Attack Disagree alert[edit]

The Angle-of-Attack Disagree alert, via an annunciator on the primary
flight display, tells the pilot that the pair of AoA sensors, which
should provide similar readings, have deviated significantly.[237] Thus,
pilots get insight into disagreements and the feature prompts for a
maintenance logbook entry.[211] 

In November 2017, after several months of MAX deliveries, Boeing
discovered that the alert was inoperable on most aircraft. The alert
function depended on the presence of an optional indicator, which was
not selected by most airlines. Boeing had determined that the defect was
not critical to aircraft safety or operation, and an internal safety
review board (SRB) corroborated Boeing's prior assessment and its
initial plan to update the aircraft in 2020. Boeing did not disclose the
defect to the FAA until November 2018, in the wake of the Lion Air
crash.[238] [239][240][241]

At Boeing, the SRB is responsible for deciding only if an issue is or is
not a safety issue; a SRB brings together multiple company subject
matter experts (SMEs) in many disciplines. The most knowledgeable SME
presents the issue, assisted and guided by the Aviation Safety
organization. The safety decision is taken as a vote. Any vote for
"safety" results in a board decision of "safety".[242]

In March 2019, a Boeing representative told Inc. magazine, "Customers
have been informed that AOA [angle of attack] disagree alert will become
a standard feature on the 737 Max. It can be retrofitted on previously
delivered airplanes."[243]

In May 2019, Boeing defended that "Neither the angle of attack indicator
nor the AoA Disagree alert are necessary for the safe operation of the
airplane." Boeing recognized that the defective software was not
implemented to their specifications as a "standard, standalone feature."
Boeing stated, "...MAX production aircraft will have an activated and
operable AOA Disagree alert and an optional angle of attack indicator.
All customers with previously delivered MAX airplanes will have the
ability to activate the AOA Disagree alert."[239] Boeing CEO Muilenburg
said the company's communication about the alert "was not consistent.
And that's unacceptable."[244][239]

On June 7, the delayed escalation on the defective Angle-of-Attack
Disagree alert on 737 MAX was investigated. The Chair of the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Chair of the
Aviation Subcommittee sent letters to Boeing, United Technologies Corp.,
and the FAA, requesting a timeline and supporting documents related to
awareness of the defect, and when airlines were notified.[245]

Flight computer architecture[edit]

In early April 2019, Boeing reported a problem with software affecting
flaps and other flight-control hardware, unrelated to MCAS; classified
as critical to flight safety, the FAA has ordered Boeing to fix the
problem correspondingly.[246] In October 2019, the European Union
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has suggested to conduct more testing on
proposed revisions to flight-control computers due to its concerns about
portions of proposed fixes to MCAS.[247]


In June 2019, "in a special Boeing simulator that is designed for
engineering reviews,"[248] FAA pilots performed a stress testing
scenario – an abnormal condition identified through FMEA after the MCAS
update was implemented[249] – for evaluating the effect of a fault in a
microprocessor: as expected from the scenario, the horizontal stabilizer
pointed the nose downward. Although the test pilot ultimately recovered
control, the system was slow to respond to the proper runaway stabilizer
checklist steps. Boeing initially classified this as a "major" hazard,
and the FAA upgraded it to a more severe "catastrophic" rating. Boeing
stated that the issue can be fixed in software.[250] The software change
will not be ready for evaluation until at least September 2019.[251]
EASA director Patrick Ky said that retrofitting additional hardware is
an option to be considered.[228]

Early news reports were inaccurate in attributing the problem to an
80286[252] microprocessor overwhelmed with data. The test scenario
simulated an event toggling five bits in the flight control computer.
The bits represent status flags such as whether MCAS is active (which
disables the cutout switch), or whether the tail trim motor is
energized. Engineers were able to simulate single event upsets and
artificially induce MCAS activation by manipulating these signals. Such
a fault occurs when memory bits change from 0 to 1 or vice versa, which
is something that can be caused by cosmic rays striking the

The failure scenario was known before the MAX entered service in 2017:
it had been assessed in a safety analysis when the plane was certified.
Boeing had concluded that pilots could perform a procedure to shut off
the motor driving the stabilizer to overcome the nose-down
movement.[254] The scenario also affects 737NG aircraft, though it
presents less risk than on the MAX. On the NG, moving the yoke counters
any uncommanded stabilizer input, but this function is bypassed on the
MAX to avoid negating the purpose of MCAS.[255] Boeing also said that it
agreed with additional requirements that the FAA required it to fulfill,
and added that it was working toward resolving the safety risk. It will
not offer the MAX for certification until all requirements have been


As of 2019[update], the two flight control computers of Boeing 737 never
cross-checked each others' operations, i.e. single non-redundant
channel. This lack of robustness existed since the early implementation
and persisted for decades.[253] The updated flight control system will
use both flight control computers and compare their outputs. This switch
to a fail-safe two-channel redundant system, with each computer using an
independent set of sensors, is a radical change from the architecture
used on 737s since the introduction on the older model 737-300 in the
1980s. Up to the MAX in its prior to groundings version, the system
alternates between computers after each flight.[253]

Type rating and training needs[edit]

In the U.S., the MAX shares a common type rating with all the other
Boeing 737 families.[256] The impetus for Boeing to build the 737 MAX
was serious competition from the Airbus A320neo, which was a threat to
win a major order for aircraft from American Airlines, a traditional
customer for Boeing airplanes.[221] Boeing decided to update its
venerable 737, first designed in the 1960s, rather than creating a
brand-new airplane, which would have cost much more and taken years
longer. Boeing's goal was to ensure the 737 MAX would not need a new
type rating, which would require significant additional pilot training,
adding unacceptably to the overall cost of the airplane for customers. 

The 737 original and main certification was issued by the FAA in 1967.
Like every new 737 model since then, the MAX has been approved partially
with the original requirements and partially with more current
regulations, enabling certain rules and requirements to be grandfathered
in.[257] Chief executive Dai Whittingham of the independent trade group
UK Flight Safety Committee disputed the idea that the MAX was just
another 737, saying, "It is a different body and aircraft but certifiers
gave it the same type rating."[258]

According to The Seattle Times, Boeing convinced the FAA, during MAX
certification in 2014, to grant exceptions to federal crew alerting

Boeing also played down the scope of MCAS to regulators. The company
"never disclosed the revamp of MCAS to FAA officials involved in
determining pilot training needs"[260]. On March 30, 2016, the Max's
chief technical pilot requested senior FAA officials to remove MCAS from
the pilot's manual. The officials had been briefed on the original
version of MCAS but Boeing never disclosed that MCAS was being
significantly overhauled.[260]

Crew manuals, pilot training and simulators[edit]

Boeing considered MCAS part of the flight control system, and elected to
not describe it in the flight manual or in training materials, based on
the fundamental design philosophy of retaining commonality with the
737NG.[221] The 1,600-page flight crew manual mentions the term MCAS
once, in the glossary.[261] Boeing published a service bulletin on
November 6, 2018, in which MCAS was anonymously referred to as a "pitch
trim system." In reference to the Lion Air accident, Boeing said the
system could be triggered by erroneous Angle of Attack information when
the aircraft is under manual control, and reminded pilots of various
indications and effects that can result from this erroneous information.
[262][8][8] Only four days later, Boeing acknowledged the existence of
MCAS in a message to operators on November 10, 2018.[6][263] 

In the months between the accidents, the FAA Aviation Safety Reporting
System received numerous U.S. pilot complaints of the aircraft's
unexpected behaviors, and how the crew manual lacked any description of
the system.[264] Most air regulatory agencies, including the FAA,
Transport Canada and EASA, didn't require specific training on MCAS.
Brazil's national civil aviation agency "was one of the only civil
aviation authorities to require specific training for the operation of
the 737-8 Max".[265] 

In February 2016, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) certified
the MAX with the expectation that pilot procedures and training would
clearly explain unusual situations in which the seldom used manual trim
wheel would be required to trim the plane, i.e. adjust the angle of the
nose; however, the original flight manual did not mention those
situations.[266] The EASA certification document referred to simulations
whereby the electric thumb switches were ineffective to properly trim
the MAX under certain conditions. The EASA document said that after
flight testing, because the thumb switches could not always control trim
on their own, the FAA was concerned by whether the 737 MAX system
complied with regulations.[267] The American Airlines flight manual
contains a similar notice regarding the thumb switches but does not
specify conditions where the manual wheel may be needed.[267]

On May 15, during a senate hearing, FAA acting administrator Daniel
Elwell defended their certification process of Boeing aircraft. However
the FAA criticized Boeing for not mentioning the MCAS in the 737 MAX's
manuals. Representative Rick Larsen responded saying that "the FAA needs
to fix its credibility problem" and that the committee would assist them
in doing so.[268][269]

On May 17, after discovering 737 MAX flight simulators could not
adequately replicate MCAS activation,[270] Boeing corrected the software
to improve the force feedback of the manual trim wheel and to ensure
realism.[271] This led to a debate on whether simulator training is a
prerequisite prior to the aircraft's eventual return to service. On May
31, Boeing proposed that simulator training for pilots flying on the 737
MAX would not be mandatory.[272] Computer training is deemed sufficient
by the FAA Flight Standardization Board, the US Airline Pilots
Association and Southwest Airlines pilots, but Transport Canada and
American Airlines urged use of simulators.[273][274] On June 19, in a
testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Chesley Sullenberger advocated for simulator training.
"Pilots need to have first-hand experience with the crash scenarios and
its conflicting indications before flying with passengers and
crew."[275][220] The "differences training" is the subject of worry by
senior industry training experts.[276]

Textron-owned simulator maker TRU Simulation + Training anticipates a
transition course but not mandatory simulator sessions in minimum
standards being developed by Boeing and the FAA.[277]

On July 24, Boeing indicated that some regulatory agencies may mandate
simulator training before return to service, and also expected some
airlines to require simulator sessions even if these are not

Runaway stabilizer trim procedure[edit]

In November 2018, Boeing's CEO Muilenburg, when asked about the
non-disclosure of MCAS, cited the "runaway stabilizer trim" procedure as
part of the training manual. He added that Boeing's bulletin pointed to
that existing flight procedure. Boeing views the "runaway stabilizer
trim" checklist as a memory item for pilots. Mike Sinnett, vice
president and general manager for the Boeing New Mid-Market Airplane
(NMA) since July 2019, repeatedly described the procedure as a "memory
item".[21] However, some airlines view it as an item for the quick
reference card.[279] The FAA issued a recommendation about memory items
in an Advisory Circular, Standard Operating Procedures and Pilot
Monitoring Duties for Flight Deck Crewmembers: "Memory items should be
avoided whenever possible. If the procedure must include memory items,
they should be clearly identified, emphasized in training, less than
three items, and should not contain conditional decision steps."[280]

In a legal complaint against Boeing, the Southwest Airlines Pilot
Association states:[281]

        An MCAS failure is not like a runaway stabilizer. A runaway
        stabilizer has continuous un-commanded movement of the tail,
        whereas MCAS is not continuous and pilots (theoretically) can
        counter the nose-down movement, after which MCAS would move the
        aircraft tail down again. Moreover, unlike runaway stabilizer,
        MCAS disables the control column response that 737 pilots have
        grown accustomed to and relied upon in earlier generations of
        737 aircraft.

In May, The Seattle Times reported that, while the cutoff switches
disconnected on the MAX, it also disabled electronic control of the trim
wheel, requiring pilot effort to correct an out-of-trim stabilizer.
[282] The cutoff switches could be "ignored" by MCAS, as determined
during the probe into the aircraft's microprocessor architecture.

Certification inquiries[edit]

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The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General opened an
investigation into FAA approval of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft series,
focusing on potential failures in the safety-review and certification
process. The day after the Ethiopian Airlines crash, a U.S. federal
grand jury issued a subpoena on behalf of the U.S. Justice Department
for documents related to development of the 737 MAX.[283][284][285][286]
On March 19, 2019, the U.S. Department of Transportation requested the
Office of Inspector General to conduct an audit on the 737 MAX
certification process[287]. The FBI has joined the criminal
investigation into the certification as well.[288][289] FBI agents
reportedly visited the homes of Boeing employees in

On July 17, representatives of crash victims' families, in testimony to
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Aviation
Subcommittee, called on regulators to re-certificate the MAX as a
completely new aircraft. They also called for wider reforms to the
certification process, and asked the committee to grant protective
subpoenas so that whistle-blowers could testify even if they had agreed
to a gag order as a condition of a settlement with Boeing.[291]

In a July 31 senate hearing, the FAA defended its administrative actions
following the Lion Air accident, noting that standard protocol in
ongoing crash investigations limited the information that could be
provided in the airworthiness directive. The agency had recognized that
pilot actions played a significant role in the Lion Air accident, and
did not dispute that FAA officials believed a recurrence of MCAS
malfunction was likely, as reported by The Wall Street

Mark Forkner, formerly Boeing's chief technical pilot on the MAX
project, has invoked the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, to avoid submitting documents to federal prosecutors
investigating the crashes.[295]


In March 2019, Congress announced an investigation into the FAA approval
process.[296] Members of Congress and government investigators expressed
concern about FAA rules that allowed Boeing to extensively
"self-certify" aircraft.[297][298] FAA acting Administrator Daniel
Elwell said "We do not allow self-certification of any kind".[299]

In September, a U.S. Congress panel asked Boeing's CEO to make several
employees available for interviews, to complement the documents and the
senior management perspective already provided.[300]

In September 2019, frustration with Boeing is mounting in Washington,
and in the FAA and in international regulators.[301] Representative
Peter DeFazio, Chair of the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, said Boeing declined his invitation to testify at a
House hearing. "Next time, it won't just be an invitation, if
necessary," he said.[301]

In September, U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
announced that Boeing CEO Muilenburg will testify before Congress
accompanied by John Hamilton, chief engineer of Boeing's Commercial
Airplanes division and Jennifer Henderson, 737 chief pilot.[302]

In October, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee asked
Boeing to allow a flight deck systems engineer who filed an internal
ethics complaint to be interviewed.[303]

Joint Authorities Technical Review[edit]

On April 19, a "Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System Joint Authorities
Technical Review" (JATR) team was commissioned by the FAA to investigate
how it approved MCAS, whether changes need to be made in the FAA's
regulatory process and whether the design of MCAS complies with
regulations.[304] On June 1st, Ali Bahrami, FAA Associate Administrator
for Aviation Safety, chartered the JATR to include representatives from
FAA, NASA and the nine civil aviation authorities of Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, Europe (EASA), Indonesia, Japan, Singapore and UAE.

On September 27, the JATR chair Christopher A. Hart said that FAA's
process for certifying new airplanes is not broken, but needs
improvements rather than a complete overhaul of the entire system. He
added "This will be the safest airplane out there by the time it has to
go through all the hoops and hurdles".[305]

According to the final report, FAA failed to properly review MCAS. About
the nature of MCAS, "the JATR team considers that the STS/MCAS and EFS
functions could be considered as stall identification systems or stall
protection systems, depending on the natural (unaugmented) stall
characteristics of the aircraft".[306] The report recommends that FAA
reviews the jet's stalling characteristics without MCAS and associated
system to determine the plane's safety and consequently if a broader
design review was needed.[307]

"The JATR team identified specific areas related to the evolution of the
design of the MCAS where the certification deliverables were not updated
during the certification program to reflect the changes to this function
within the flight control system. In addition, the design assumptions
were not adequately reviewed, updated, or validated; possible flight
deck effects were not evaluated; the SSA and functional hazard
assessment (FHA) were not consistently updated; and potential crew
workload effects resulting from MCAS design changes were not
identified."[306] Nor has Boeing carried out a thorough verification by
stress-testing of the MCAS[308]

Boeing exerted “undue pressures” on Boeing ODA engineering unit members
(who had FAA authority to approve design changes).[306][309]

Office of Special Counsel investigation[edit]

On April 2, 2019, after receiving reports from whistle-blowers regarding
the training of FAA inspectors who reviewed the 737 MAX type
certificate, the Senate Commerce Committee launched a second
Congressional investigation; it focuses on FAA training of the

The FAA provided misleading statements to Congress about the training of
its inspectors, most possibly those inspectors that oversaw the Max
certification, according to the findings of an Office of Special Counsel
investigation released in September. The Office of Special Counsel is an
organization investigating whistleblower reports. Its report infers that
safety inspectors "assigned to the 737 Max had not met qualification

The OSC sided with the whistleblower, pointing out that internal FAA
reviews had reached the same conclusion. In a letter to President Trump,
the OSC found that 16 of 22 FAA pilots conducting safety reviews, some
of them assigned to the MAX two years ago, "lacked proper training and

Safety inspectors participate in Flight Standardization Boards, that
ensure pilot competency by developing training and experience
requirements. FAA policy requires both formal classroom training and
on-the-job training for safety inspectors.[315]

Special Counsel Henry J. Kerner wrote in the letter to the President,
"This information specifically concerns the 737 Max and casts serious
doubt on the FAA's public statements regarding the competency of agency
inspectors who approved pilot qualifications for this aircraft".[316]

In September, Daniel Elwell disputed the conclusions of the OSC, which
found that aviation safety inspectors (ASIs) assigned to the 737-MAX
certifications lacked sufficient training requirements.[317][318]To
clarify the facts, lawmakers asked the FAA to provide additional
information :

        We are particularly concerned about the Special Counsel's
        findings that inconsistencies in training requirements have
        resulted in the FAA relaxing safety inspector training
        requirements and thereby adopting "a position that encourages
        less qualified, accredited, and trained safety inspectors."  We
        request that the FAA provide documents confirming that all FAA
        employees serving on the FSB for the Boeing 737-MAX and the
        Gulfstream VII had the required foundational training in
        addition to any other specific training requirements.[319]


Aircraft manufacturers[edit]


Accidents and grounding[edit]

The Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft roll-out at Renton factory, December 2015
Boeing issued a brief statement after each crash, saying it was "deeply
saddened" by the loss of life and offered its "heartfelt sympathies to
the families and loved ones" of the passengers and crews. It said it was
helping with the Lion Air investigation and sending a technical team to
assist in the Ethiopia investigation.[320][321]

As non-U.S. countries and airlines began grounding the 737 MAX, Boeing
stated: "at this point, based on the information available, we do not
have any basis to issue new guidance to operators."[322] Boeing said "in
light of" the Ethiopian Airlines crash, the company would postpone the
scheduled March 13 public roll-out ceremony for the first completed
Boeing 777X.[323]

When the FAA grounded the MAX aircraft on March 13, Boeing stated it
"continues to have full confidence in the safety of the 737 MAX.
However, after consultation with the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), and aviation authorities and its customers around the world,
Boeing has determined — out of an abundance of caution and in order to
reassure the flying public of the aircraft's safety — to recommend to
the FAA the temporary suspension of operations of the entire global
fleet of 737 MAX aircraft."[324]

After the grounding, Boeing suspended 737 MAX deliveries to customers,
but continued production at a rate of 52 aircraft per month.[325] In
mid-April, the production rate was reduced to 42 aircraft per
month.[326] In May 2019, Boeing reported a 56% drop in plane deliveries
year on year.[327] In July 2019, after reporting its financial results,
Boeing stated that it would consider further reducing or even shutting
down production if the grounding lasts longer than expected.[328][278]
On August 23, Boeing announced that if the FAA clears the aircraft to
return to service by October 2019, production would return from 42
aircraft per month to 52 by the end of February, and then climb to 57
per month by summer 2020.[329]

Investigation feedback[edit]

Between the Ethiopian accident and US groundings, Boeing stated that
upgrades to the MCAS flight control software, cockpit displays,
operation manuals and crew training were underway due to findings from
the Lion Air crash. Boeing anticipated software deployment in the coming
weeks and said the upgrade would be made mandatory by an FAA
Airworthiness Directive.[330] The FAA stated it anticipated clearing the
software update by March 25, 2019, allowing Boeing to distribute it to
the grounded fleets.[331] On April 1, the FAA announced the software
upgrade was delayed because more work was necessary.[332]

On March 14, Boeing reiterated that pilots can always use manual trim
control to override software commands, and that both its Flight Crew
Operations Manual and November 6 bulletin offer detailed procedures for
handling incorrect angle-of-attack readings.[333][334]

On April 4, 2019, Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg acknowledged that MCAS
played a role in both crashes. His comments came in response to public
release of preliminary results of the Ethiopian Airlines accident
investigation, which suggested pilots performed the recovery procedure.
Muilenburg stated it was "apparent that in both flights" MCAS activated
due to "erroneous angle of attack information." He said the MCAS
software update and additional training and information for pilots would
"eliminate the possibility of unintended MCAS activation and prevent an
MCAS-related accident from ever happening again".[217] Boeing reported
that 96 test flights were flown with the updated software.[335][336] 

In an earnings call that took place on April 24, 2019, Muilenburg said
the aircraft was properly designed and certificated, and denied that any
"technical slip or gap" existed. He said there were "actions or actions
not taken that contributed to the final outcome".[337] On April 29, he
claimed that the pilots did not "completely" follow the procedures that
Boeing had outlined. He said Boeing was working to make the airplane
even safer.[338][264]

On May 5, Boeing asserted that "Neither the angle of attack indicator
nor the AOA Disagree alert are necessary for the safe operation of the
airplane. They provide supplemental information only, and have never
been considered safety features on commercial jet transport
airplanes."[239] On May 29, Muilenburg acknowledged that the crashes had
damaged the public's trust.[339] Before the June Paris Air Show,
Muilenburg said, regarding the AoA disagree indicator, that Boeing made
"a mistake in the implementation of the alert" and the company's
communication "was not consistent. And that's unacceptable."[244]

On August 4, 2019, Boeing stated they conducted around 500 test flights
with updated software,[340] and Wired reported that one test flight
involved multiple altitude changes.[341]

Corporate structure and new safety practices[edit]

Following panel review recommendations, Boeing has strengthened its
engineering oversight. As of August 2019, Muilenburg receives weekly
reports of potential safety issues from rank-and-file engineers -
thousands will report to chief engineers rather than to separate
programs, helping them reach senior management more effectively.[342]

On September 2019, The New York Times reported that Boeing board will
call for structural changes after the 737 Max crashes: changing
corporate reporting structures, a new safety group, future plane
cockpits designed for new pilots with less training. The committee,
established in April, did not investigate the Max crashes, but produced
the first findings for a reform of Boeing's internal structures since
then. It will recommend engineers to report to the chief engineer rather
than business management, to avoid pressure from business leaders
against engineers who identify safety issues. The committee found that
inter-group communication was lacking within engineering and between
Seattle offices and corporate headquarters during the certification
work. The safety group will ensure information is shared and the
certification work is independent. The group will report to senior
leadership and a new permanent committee on the board.[301][343]

The board said in September that Boeing should also work with airlines
to "re-examine assumptions around flight deck design and operation" and
recommend pilot training criteria beyond traditional training programs
"where warranted".[344]

Key positions[edit]

In July 2019, Boeing announced the retirement of 737 program leader Eric
Lindblad, the second person to depart that post in two years. He held
the job less than a year, but was not involved in development of the
MAX. His predecessor, Scott Campbell, retired in August 2018, amid late
deliveries of 737 MAX engines and other components. Lindblad assumed the
role shortly before the program became embattled in two accidents and
ongoing groundings. He will be succeeded by Mark Jenks, vice president
of the Boeing New Midsize Airplane program and previously in charge of
the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.[345][346][relevant? – discuss]

In October 2019, on the day the JATR published its report, Boeing
announced the separation of the CEO and chairman roles,[347] allowing
Muilenburg to focus on getting the MAX back in the air. The board
elected David L. Calhoun to serve as non-executive chairman; he is an
independent lead director, and former boss of GE Aviation and potential
Boeing CEO. Boeing has resisted earlier calls from shareholder activists
to split the roles. [348][349][350][309]

Current and former employees[edit]

In May 2019, engineers said that Boeing pushed to limit safety testing
to accelerate planes certification, including 737 MAX.[351] FAA said it
has "received no whistleblower complaints or any other reports ...
alleging pressure to speed up 737 MAX certification." Former engineers
at Boeing blamed company executives of cost-cutting, over more than a
decade, yielding to low morale and reduced engineering staffing, which
"they argue contributed to two recent deadly crashes involving Boeing
737 Max jets."[352]

In June 2019, Boeing's software development practices came under
criticism from current and former engineers. Software development work
for the MAX was reportedly complicated by Boeing's decision to outsource
work to lower-paid contractors, including Indian companies HCL
Technologies and Cyient, though these contractors did not work on MCAS
or the AoA disagree alert. Management pressure to limit changes that
might introduce extra time or cost was also highlighted.[353][354][355]

On October 2, 2019, The Seattle Times and The New York Times reported
that a Boeing engineer, Curtis Ewbank, filed an internal complaint
alleging that company managers rejected a backup system for determining
speed, which might have alerted pilots to problems linked to two deadly
crashes of 737 Max. A similar backup system is installed on the larger
Boeing 787 jet, but it was rejected for 737 Max because it could
increase costs and training requirements for pilots. Ewbank said the
backup system could have reduced risks that contributed to two fatal
crashes, though he could not be sure that it would have prevented them.
He also said in his complaint that Boeing management was more concerned
with costs and keeping the Max on schedule than on safety.[356][303] An
attorney representing families of the Ethiopian crash victims will seek
sworn evidence from the whistleblower.[357]


A prototype Airbus A319neo equipped with CFM International LEAP-1A
In May 2019, executives of Boeing competitor Airbus told reporters they
do not view the relationship between Boeing and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) as having been corrupted. They compared the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the FAA, saying "EASA has a
slightly different mandate than the FAA. EASA is a purely safety
orientated agency."[358] Airbus Chief Commercial Officer Christian
Scherer did not feel the 737 MAX is a variant that has stretched the
original 737 too far: "The MAX is not one stretch too many, in my humble
opinion". Airbus leader Remi Maillard stated: "We work hand in hand with
the regulators, and with the OEMs to adopt the safety standards. But, to
be clear, our internal safety standards are even more stringent than
what is required by the regulators". Scherer remarked on the way
manufacturers can learn from accidents: "Whenever there is an accident
out there, the first question that gets asked in an Airbus management
meeting is: can we learn from it?"

Airbus continued to earn customer orders in the wake of the 737 MAX
grounding, booking over US$11 billion in orders,[359] with
similar[clarification needed] additional orders from airlines that are
either canceling their 737 MAX orders altogether, or reducing

The Airbus A320neo and the 737 MAX both use engines from the CFM LEAP
family, with different thrust requirements. After EASA issued an
airworthiness directive regarding potential excess pitch during specific
maneuvers, Airbus made a preemptive change to the flight manual to
protect the aircraft in such situations.[361][362] In response to the
EASA recommendations, Lufthansa temporarily blocked the rearmost row of
seats until a flight computer update increases the effectiveness of the
aircraft's angle of attack protection.[363][relevant? – discuss]

Operators and professionals[edit]


American Airlines was the first U.S. airline to cancel a route when it
canceled its route from Dallas, Texas to Oakland, California.[364]

Southwest Airlines notified their pilots that an optional feature, AoA
indication on the cockpit displays, will be enabled to all aircraft in
its fleet on November 30, 2018, shortly after Boeing had disclosed to
airlines the existence of MCAS and the defective AoA disagree
alert.[365][366] On July 26, the airline announced it would stop
operations out of Newark Liberty International Airport due to the

United Airlines' CEO Oscar Munoz said that passengers would still feel
uncertain about flying on a Boeing 737 MAX even after the software
update.[368] United announced the cancellation of a route between
Chicago, Illinois and Leon, Mexico.[369]

Ethiopian Airlines said "These tragedies continue to weigh heavily on
our hearts and minds, and we extend our sympathies to the loved ones of
the passengers and crew on board Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302".[370] The CEO also pushed back and rejected the
notion that his airlines pilots were not fully trained or experienced, a
notion intimated in the US House of Representatives in a recent hearing
by the FAA director. Ethiopian Airlines rejects the accusation of
piloting error.[371] He said: "As far as the training is concerned ...
we've gone according to the Boeing recommendation and FAA-approved one.
We are not expected to speculate or to imagine something that doesn't
exist at all".[372] In June, Ethiopian Airlines CEO Tewolde Gebremariam
expressed his confidence in the process for bringing the MAX back into
service, and expected Ethiopian to be the last carrier to resume

Ethiopian Airline's ex-chief engineer filed a whistleblower complaint to
the regulators about alleged corruption in Ethiopian Airlines. He is
also seeking asylum in the U.S. He said that, a day after the Flight 302
crash, the carrier altered maintenance records of a Boeing 737 MAX
aircraft. He submits that the alteration was part of a generalized
culture of corruption "that included fabricating documents, signing off
on shoddy repairs and even beating those who got out of line".[374]

In March 2019, RT reported the indefinite suspension of contracts for
the purchase by Russian airlines of dozens of aircraft, including
Aeroflot's Pobeda subsidiary, S7 Airlines, Ural Airlines and UTair.
Vitaly Savelyev, Aeroflot's CEO, said that "the company would refuse
operating MAX planes ordered by Pobeda".[375]

On June 18, International Airlines Group (IAG) announced plans for a
fleet comprising 200 Boeing 737 MAX jets. Boeing and IAG signed a letter
of intent at the Paris Air Show valued at a list price of over US
$24 billion.[376]

Bjorn Kjos, ex-CEO of Norwegian Air Shuttle who stepped down in July,
stated in July that the company "has a huge appetite for 737 MAX jets",
according to a report from American City Business Journals.[377] He had
said : "It is quite obvious that we will not take the cost... We will
send this bill to those who produced this aircraft."[378]

In mid-July, Ryanair warned that some of its bases would be subject to
short-term closures in 2020, due to the shortfall in MAX deliveries, and
pointed out that the MAX 200 version it has ordered will require
separate certification expected to take a further two months after the
MAX returns to service.[379] By the end of July, Ryanair CEO Michael
O'Leary expressed further concerns and frustration with the delays and
revealed that, in parallel with discussions with Boeing regarding a
potential order for new aircraft to be delivered from 2023, he was also
talking to Airbus which was offering very aggressive pricing.[380]

Flight crew[edit]

In a private meeting on November 27, 2018, American Airlines pilots
pressed Boeing managers to develop an urgent fix for MCAS and suggested
that the FAA require a safety review which in turn could have grounded
the airplanes.[381][382] A recording of the meeting revealed pilots'
anger that they were not informed about MCAS. One pilot was heard
saying, "We flat out deserve to know what is on our airplanes."[383] It
is worth noting that a US pilot asked for more training prior to his
first flight on the 737 MAX several months before the first crash of
Lion Air Flight 610.[384] Afterwards, in June 2019, the American
Airlines pilot union openly criticized Boeing for not fully explaining
the existence or operation of MCAS: "However, at APA we remained
concerned about whether the new training protocol, materials and method
of instruction suggested by Boeing are adequate to ensure that pilots
across the globe flying the MAX fleet can do so in absolute complete
safety"[385] Boeing vice president Mike Sinnett explained that the
company did not want to make changes in a rush, because of uncertainty
whether the Lion Air accident was related to MCAS. Sinnett said Boeing
expected pilots to be able to handle any control problems.[381]

In addition, the U.S. Aviation Safety Reporting System received messages
about the 737 MAX from U.S. pilots in November 2018, including one from
a captain who expressed concern that systems such as the MCAS are not
fully described in the aircraft flight manual.[386][387] Captain Mike
Michaelis, chairman of the safety committee of the Allied Pilots
Association at American Airlines said "It's pretty asinine for them to
put a system on an airplane and not tell the pilots … especially when it
deals with flight controls".[388]

U.S. pilots also complained about the way the 737 MAX performed,
including claims of problems similar to those reported about the Lion
Air crash.[389] Pilots of at least two U.S. flights in 2018, reported
the nose of the 737 MAX pitched down suddenly when they engaged the
autopilot.[390] The FAA stated in response that "Some of the reports
reference possible issues with the autopilot/autothrottle, which is a
separate system from MCAS, and/or acknowledge the problems could have
been due to pilot error."[391]

U.S. labor unions representing pilots and flight attendants had
different opinions on whether or not to ground the aircraft. Two flight
attendant unions, AFA and the APFA favored groundings,[392] while pilot
unions such as the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association,[393] APA, and
ALPA, expressed confidence in continued operation of the aircraft.[394]


On March 12, 2019, Jim Hall, a former chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board, the U.S. agency that investigates airplane
crashes, said the FAA should ground the airplane.[395]

Retired airline captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, who gained fame in
the Miracle on the Hudson accident in 2009, said, "These crashes are
demonstrable evidence that our current system of aircraft design and
certification has failed us. These accidents should never have
happened."[396] He sharply criticized Boeing and the FAA, saying they
"have been found wanting in this ugly saga". He said the overly "cozy
relationship" between the aviation industry and government was seen when
the Boeing CEO "reached out to the U.S. President to try to keep the 737
MAX 8 from being grounded." He also lamented understaffing and
underfunding of the FAA. "Good business means that it is always better
and cheaper to do it right instead of doing it wrong and trying to
repair the damage after the fact, and when lives are lost, there is no
way to repair the damage."[397] He said AoA indicators might have helped
in these two crashes. "It is ironic that most modern aircraft measure
(angle of attack) and that information is often used in many aircraft
systems, but it is not displayed to pilots. Instead, pilots must infer
(angle of attack) from other parameters, deducing it indirectly."[398]
In October, Sullenberger wrote, "These emergencies did not present as a
classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous
unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS."[399]

Peter Goelz, a former managing director of the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), said: "One of the ways Boeing marketed the 737 Max
was the modest amount of training up for current 737 pilots. You didn't
have to go back to the Sim [the flight simulator] again and again."[400]
James E. Hall, chairman of the NTSB from 1994 to 2001, blamed the FAA
regulators for giving too much power to the airline industry.[283][401]
In July, Hall and Goelz co-signed an opinion letter to The New York
Times, in which they said: "Boeing has found a willing partner in the
FAA, which allowed the company to circumvent standard certification
processes so it could sell aircraft more quickly. Boeing's inadequate
regard for safety and the FAA's complicity display an unconscionable
lack of leadership at both organizations." The letter went on to compare
the current crisis with Boeing's handling of Boeing 737 rudder issues in
the 1990s.[401] 

Andrew Skow, a former Northrop Grumman chief engineer, assessed Boeing
as having good track record modernizing of the 737, but, "They may have
pushed it too far."[402]

A former professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Andrew
Kornecki, who is an expert in redundancy systems, said operating with
one or two sensors "would be fine if all the pilots were sufficiently
trained in how to assess and handle the plane in the event of a
problem". But, he would much prefer building the plane with three
sensors, as Airbus does.[403]

John Goglia, former member of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), criticized Boeing and the FAA for not protecting FAA-designated
oversight engineers from Boeing management pressure. Commenting on the
2016 removal of a senior engineer who had insisted on improved testing
of a fire suppression system, he said that management action of this
kind produces a chilling effect on others and "negates the whole
system."[351] He also criticized Congress for pushing the FAA to
delegate even more to the industry, as it passed the 2018 FAA
Reauthorization Act, which mandated further expansion of the ODA
program. "Apparently, Congress didn't think the FAA was delegating
enough to ODA holders. [...] many of its members are also accepting
campaign donations from aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing, which
clearly have an interest in pushing the FAA to delegate more and more
authority to manufacturers with as little oversight as possible".[404]

Author, journalist, and pilot William Langewiesche wrote his first
article in The New York Times Magazine, saying: "What we had in the two
downed airplanes was a textbook failure of airmanship."[6][405]. To
which, another aviation author, Christine Negroni wrote back "the
argument that more competent pilots could have handled the problem is
not knowable to Langewiesche and it misses the most basic tenet of air
safety anyway."[406]She explains that an accident investigation is not
about blame, is not only about what happened, but rather strives to
identify the root causes. The counterpoint's essence is that
Langewiesche downplays the "failure of systems and processes that put a
deeply flawed airplane in the hands of pilots around the world".

In September, aerospace analyst Richard Aboulafia said about Boeing:
"This is an engineering company, it needs an engineering culture and
engineering management; It deviated pretty far from this at the time
when the MAX was being developed."[407]

Lawyers, analysts and experts considered Boeing's public statements to
be contradictory and unconvincing.[408] They said Boeing refused to
answer tough questions and accept responsibility, defended the airplane
design and certification while "promising to fix the plane's software",
delayed to ground planes and issue an apology, and yet was quick to
assign blame towards pilot error.[409][410]

Engineering experts have pointed out misconceptions of the general
public and media concerning the 737 MAX characteristics and the


Consumer advocates[edit]

In May 2019, the consumer advocate organization Flyers Rights opposed
the FAA's position of not requiring simulator training for 737 MAX
pilots. It also asked to extend the comment period to allow independent
experts to "share their expertise with the FAA and Boeing".[412]

In the following month, June, consumer advocate Ralph Nader, who lost a
grandniece in one of the accidents, claimed that the Boeing 737 "must
never fly again... it's not a matter of software. It's a matter of
structural design defect: the plane's engines are too much for the
traditional fuselage". Nader also called for Boeing top leaders to
resign. Boeing spokesman Charles Bickers said in an email, responding to
Mr. Nader, that Boeing extended its condolences to Nader and all the
relatives of the people that lost their lives in the accidents but said
that "safety is our top priority as we make the changes necessary to
return the MAX to service".[413][414]


A March 2019, poll suggested that 53% of American adults would not want
to fly on a 737 MAX plane if the aircraft were to be cleared by the FAA
the following week.[415] In July, Southwest Airlines reprinted aircraft
safety cards that were shared between the MAX and the rest of the
Southwest 737-800 fleet.[416]

Investment company UBS does not "anticipate significant share erosion"
as it ran a public poll run showing 8% of the U.S. flying public would
never fly the 737 MAX, (dropping to 3% when including that two-thirds
seldom or never check the aircraft type before booking a flight), while
60% would fly it after at least six months of safe operations and a
tenth would fly it after one to three months, not mattering much as
airliner procurement time-frames are five to ten-plus years.[417]

Per an online survey for Atmosphere of 2,000 U.S. passengers ending May
first, 14 per cent of respondents would definitely fly on a MAX within
six months of its return.[418]

Various strategies to reinstate public confidence into the MAX are being


In Harvard Business Review, Amy C. Edmondson writes that Boeing needs a
full organizational culture change. "But how telling it is that it takes
a cataclysmic event (two, actually) for executives to take culture

News media[edit]

On March 11, just after the FAA reaffirmed the MAX's safety, several
western media outlets, including the Financial Times, The New York
Times, Fox News, and CNBC, questioned China's motives for grounding the
aircraft by suggesting the action was either "politically motivated" or
that China was "potentially benefiting from the


      * On March 12, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted a complaint
        about complex airplane systems, and Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg
        called the president to assure him of the 737 MAX's
        safety.[425][426][427] The FAA stated hours later that it had
        "no basis to order grounding the aircraft" and no data from
        other countries to justify such action.[428]
      * U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren, Mitt Romney, Dianne Feinstein,
        Ted Cruz, Roger Wicker and Richard Blumenthal called for the FAA
        to temporarily ground all 737 MAX 8 and MAX 9
        jets.[429][430][431] Cruz and Wicker announced plans to hold a
        hearing in the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Aviation and
        Space "to investigate these crashes, determine their
        contributing factors, and ensure that the United States aviation
        industry remains the safest in the world."[431] Warren went as
        far as to question if the Trump administration was protecting
      * Kyrsten Sinema among other U.S. Senators at a March 28, 2019,
        hearing questioned a panel of regulators in the committee
        responsible for aviation oversight in the US Senate, "Is there
        more we need to do?"[433] Kyrsten also questioned why more
        detail was not included in the flight operations manuals given
        to pilots not offering details of new features and systems like
        MCAS since the previous models: "Can you talk about why this was
        not included in pilot training material?"[434]
      * On April 15, 2019, President Trump tweeted : "What do I know
        about branding, maybe nothing (but I did become President!), but
        if I were Boeing, I would FIX the Boeing 737 MAX, add some
        additional great features, & REBRAND the plane with a new

Financial impact[edit]

Boeing reported a record quarterly loss of $2.9 billion in the second
quarter of 2019, as it provisioned $4.9 billion for airlines
compensation. Its inventory has grown by $6 billion, it has postponed
development of the Boeing New Midsize Airplane and its stock market
value has dropped by $62 billion as its share price lost 25% between
March and August 2019. Including the knock-on cost for airlines and the
supply chain, the groundings cost $4 billion per quarter. At the time of
the grounding, Boeing's annual revenue was $100 billion, 60% of which
came from sales to airliners. The 737 MAX represented one third of sales
to airlines. The company had a 10% profit margin, for an annual profit
of $10 billion. It employed 137,000 people in the United States and paid
$45 billion to 13,600 domestic suppliers, which employed a further
1.3 million people, accounting for about 1% of the American


On March 13, Norwegian became the first airline to publicly demand
compensation from Boeing for the costs of the groundings of the 737 MAX.
CEO Bjørn Kjos said, "It is quite obvious we will not take the cost
related to the new aircraft that we have to park temporarily, we will
send this bill to those who produce this aircraft."[437] India's
SpiceJet also announced that they will seek compensation from Boeing. A
senior official said, "We will seek compensation from Boeing for the
grounding of the aircraft. We will also seek recompense for revenue loss
and any kind of maintenance or technical overhaul that the aircraft will
have to undergo. This is part of the contract, which we signed with
Boeing for all the 737 MAX aircraft."[438] On April 10 state-owned China
Eastern Airlines requested compensation from Boeing over the

Airlines have countered the capacity loss by extending leases, deferring
maintenance, rearranging aircraft assignments, and canceling flights;
most have removed the 737 MAX from schedules. On May 22, Bloomberg L.P.
estimated Boeing's reimbursements will approach $1.4 billion based on
typical operating profit per aircraft, won't be allocated until
"expected deliveries are made" and compensation can include order
changes.[440] Chinese carriers estimates the cost of the grounding at
CNY4 billion ($579 million) by the end of June.[441] The delivery delay
will cost Ryanair about a million passengers through the summer of 2019,
but the low-cost carrier remains confident in Boeing and would prefer
better pricing on future orders rather than cash compensation.[442]

Southwest Airlines, the largest operator the plane with 34 737
MAXs,[443] canceled thousands of flights and said the aircraft had a
financial impact of $225 million for the first half of 2019.[444]
Southwest has been discussing a reimbursement package with

American Airlines canceled 115 flights a day, lowering estimated
full-year pretax revenue by $350 million.[445]

Brazil's Gol expects to spend respectively 1% and 2% more than planned
on fuel in the third and fourth quarters of 2019, according to its Chief
Financial Officer.[446]

Globally, Official Airline Guide (OAG) estimates that the grounding will
cost airlines $4 billion of sales by November.[436]


In June 2019, 737 MAX pilots jointly filed a class action against Boeing
for lost wages due to the grounding, claiming that Boeing attempted to
cover-up design flaws with the aircraft.[447]

Unlike the maximum claim by a passenger against an airline, which is
limited by the Montreal Convention, claims against the manufacturer are
not subject to a preset limit. In effect since 1999, the convention
requires an airline, regardless of fault, if it is based in a country
that ratified the treaty, to pay around $170,000 each as a minimum
liability.[citation needed]

Representatives of passengers on Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 may be
able to argue that Boeing knew, or should have known or contemplated,
the risk of a crash from knowledge of MCAS and previous issues,
including the earlier Lion Air crash, potentially opening a route to
punitive damages.[448] According to lawyers involved in passenger
claims, the U.S. legal structure for damage claims is often
plaintiff-friendly, and Boeing may therefore attempt to argue that
claims on behalf of deceased passengers should be heard in other

On July 3, Boeing announced it would set aside $100 million to help
families of victims with education, hardship and living expenses and for
community programs and economic development. However, the plan was
criticized by several families, calling it "too vague" and citing that
Boeing did not consult them ahead of time. Boeing initially did not
explain how it would allocate the money.[449][450] Boeing later
announced it dedicates half to distribute to families of victims, under
the oversight of veteran U.S. compensation expert Ken Feinberg. The
remainder is reserved for government and community projects. Boeing said
that the fund distributions are independent from the outcome of

On September 25, Boeing began to settle the first lawsuits with families
of the Lion Air crash victims. It has been reported that each of the
settlements costed $1.2 million.[452][453]

On October 7, Southwest Airlines Pilots Association filed a suit against
Boeing, arguing it misled the airline's labor union. The association
said the MAX grounding cost its pilots over $100 million in lost income,
which it claims Boeing should pay.[454]


At the time of the grounding, Boeing had 4,636 unfilled orders worldwide
for the 737 MAX.[455] Following the grounding, Boeing suspended
deliveries of 737 MAX aircraft to customers, and slowed production of
the aircraft. Analysts estimated that each month of the grounding could
result in a delay of $1.8 billion in revenue to the company.[325] The
total magnitude of the unfilled orders was estimated at
$600 billion.[456] 

Key contractual provisions, including the right to cancel delayed
deliveries, come into effect on October 1 for a number of major
customers, and analysts therefore expect more cancellations from that

On March 11, the day after Ethiopian Airlines crash, Lion Air announced
its plans to drop a US$22 billion order with Boeing in favor of Airbus
aircraft.[458] On March 22, Indonesian flag carrier Garuda Indonesia
requested the cancellation of 49 orders, citing "Garuda passengers in
Indonesia have lost trust and no longer have the confidence".[459]

On April 30, Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury said the 737 MAX grounding "is
not changing the mid- to long-term picture" as "[Airbus is] limited by
the supply chain": it should reach a monthly A320 production rate of 60
by mid-2019 before 63 in 2021 while Boeing reduced MAX monthly output to
42 from 52.[460]

On June 3, Azerbaijan Airlines planned to postpone its order of 10 737
MAX 8s.[461]

On July 7, Saudi Arabian budget carrier flyadeal put on hold its order
of 30 737 MAX 8s, planning to replace it with the Airbus A320neo
family.[462] On July 29, Turkish Airlines was considering plans to
cancel all its remaining Boeing 737 MAX orders, namely for 54 737 MAX 8s
and nine 737 MAX 9s, in favor of the Airbus A320neo and additional
Airbus A321neo due to safety concerns and loss of trust and confidence
with the 737 MAX.[463] On July 31, China Southern Airlines said it was
suspending its order for 64 737 MAX 8s, which were due to join the 26
already in its fleet.[464]

As of August 2019[update], no new orders had been added to the 737 MAX
backlog for the sixth consecutive month,[465] though none had been
canceled either.[436] On August 27, media reported that Russian Rostec's
subsidiary Avia, filed a lawsuit in the USA to cancel an order for 35
MAX jets.[466][467][468]

In September, Ryanair froze payments to Boeing and started talks on
recouping costs of the delay.[469]

The first order during the groundings came on October 8, from an
unidentified business jet customer.[470] Royal Air Maroc (RAM) has
suspended a deal to purchase two Boeing 737 MAX jets.[471]

Boeing's financial results[edit]

In the days following the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on
March 10, Boeing stock price went down. By March 14, the stock lost 11%
of its value.[456] By March 23, the stock had lost 18% of its value,
which represented a $40 billion drop in market capitalization.[472] On
April 8, 2019, Bank of America downgraded Boeing's stock after
production of the 737 MAX was reduced.[473] On April 10, a class action
lawsuit was filed against Boeing in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois by a shareholder who accused the company
of "covering up safety problems with its 737 MAX".[474]

On April 24, Boeing released its first-quarter results.[475] The company
announced that the grounding of the 737 MAX would cost as much as
$1 billion. It consequently suspended its stock buyback program and
announced that the previously released earnings forecasts, which were
compiled prior to the grounding, were no longer valid and new forecasts
will be released in the future.[476][477] Boeing also blamed the
grounding for a 21% drop in quarterly profits relative to the quarterly
profits from the previous year.[478]

On May 7, Barclays downgraded Boeing stock after conducting a passenger
survey that showed nearly half those polled would not fly on the
airplane for a year or more after it returns to service.[479] On July
18, Boeing announced that it was to take a $4.9 billion after-tax charge
in the second quarter of 2019. This corresponds to its initial estimate
of the cost of compensation to airlines, but not the cost of lawsuits,
potential fines, or the less tangible cost to its reputation. It also
said that its estimated production costs would rise by $1.7 billion,
primarily due to higher costs associated with the reduced production
rate.[480] On July 22, Fitch Ratings and Moody's lowered Boeing's
outlooks to negative from stable, in light of the 737 MAX
situation.[481] Boeing said the total cost of groundings approached $8
billion in July.[378]

On July 24, Boeing released its second-quarter results. The company
reported a $2.9 billion loss due to the groundings.[482] It also warned
that production might need to be reduced or even suspended if the
groundings last longer than Boeing's current assumptions of a return to
service in the fourth quarter of 2019.[278] In July 2019, Boeing
desisted from a $60 billion Pentagon procurement to replace land-based
nuclear missiles. Some analysts[weasel words] said that Boeing's ability
to pursue big military projects is reduced due to the financial cost of
the groundings.[483]


As it gets half its revenues supplying 737 fuselages, Spirit AeroSystems
saw margins slip and is cutting work time while it lost 28% of its
market capitalisation ($3 billion) since March. As it is paid only on
plane deliveries, the cashflow of the MAX engines supplier, a joint
venture General Electric and Safran, could be reduced by $1.4 billion in
2019. Composite materials supplier Allegheny Technologies has been
similarly hit, but others like United Technologies (UTC) or Senior plc
are more insulated.[436]

As of September 2019[update], Safran expects to see the groundings
affect its finances in the second half of 2019. The "decrease of
pre-payments for future deliveries" is expected to reduce free cash flow
in each semester by €300 million (354 million USD).[484]

Aviation insurance[edit]

The insurance payout will likely be the biggest ever, according to S&P
Global Ratings. According to director Marc-Philippe Juilliard, the
crashes and the groundings of the MAX since March are "worst disaster in
the history" of aviation insurance.[485]

The grounding of Boeing's 737 MAX has put pressure on insurance rates.
They are likely to rise by more than 10 percent in 2019, even as
underwriters try to narrow the insurance contract language about
coverage for groundings.[486]

Return to service[edit]

Aviation authorities[edit]

By convention, aviation regulators worldwide accept the certification of
aircraft from the country of manufacture and do not review those
certifications in much detail.[487] For example, Canada accepted FAA's
MAX certification in June 2017 under a bilateral agreement.[488] 

Canadian Minister of Transport Garneau said in March 2019, however, that
Transport Canada will do its own certification of Boeing's software
update "even if it's certified by the FAA."[488] . On October 4 2019,
the head of civil aviation for Transport Canada , said that global
regulators are considering the requirements for the 737 MAX to fly
again, weighing in the "startle factors" that can overwhelm pilots
lacking sufficient exposure in simulation scenarios. He also said that
Transport Canada raised questions over the architecture of the angle of
attack system.[489]

India's regulator DGCA will conduct its own validation tests of the MAX
before authorizing it in India's airspace. Arun Kumar, Director General
of DGCA, said India will adopt a "wait and watch" policy and not hurry
to reauthorize the plane to fly. He also said a independent validation
will be performed to ensure safety and MAX pilots will have to train on
a simulator. India's SpiceJet has already received 13 MAX jets and has
155 more on order.[490][491]

The U.A.E.'s director general of the General Civil Aviation Authority
(GCAA), Said Mohammed al-Suwaidi, announced GCAA will conduct its own
assessment, rather than follow the FAA. The U.A.E. regulator had yet not
seen Boeing's fixes in detail.[492] He doesn't expect the 737 MAX to be
back in service in 2019.[493]

Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority said that the FAA decision
would be an important factor in allowing the Max to fly, but CASA will
make its own decision.[494] In October 2019 SilkAir flew its six 737
MAXs from Singapore to Alice Springs Airport for storage during
Singapore's wet season.[495]

As of October 2019 the disagreements over various system revision
details as well as Level of Involvement (LoI) between the two leading
aviation authorities, FAA and EASA, could delay the 737 MAX return to

Federal Aviation Administration[edit]

The FAA certifies the design of aircraft and components that are used in
civil aviation operations. The FAA is "performance-based, proactive,
centered on managing risk, and focused on continuous improvement."[496]

As with any other FAA certification, the MAX certification included:
reviews to show that system designs and the MAX complied with FAA
regulations; ground tests and flight tests; evaluation of the airplane's
required maintenance and operational suitability; collaboration with
other civil aviation authorities on aircraft approval. 

The FAA has basically never allowed companies to police themselves or
self-certify their aircraft.[497] However, the FAA delegated to Boeing
vast portions of the certification process.[498]

Per the FAA and Industry Guide to Product Certification,[499] the FAA
had latitude in delegating responsibilities to Boeing:

        The practical implementation of the accountability framework is
        for the FAA to exercise its discretion on the level of
        involvement necessary to make a finding that the Applicant has
        shown compliance with all the applicable requirements before
        issuing a design approval. 
        The FAA's responsibilities, starting with top management,
        a. Enabling Applicants to maximize delegation within their
        projects, processes, and procedures (ODAs & non-ODAs), 
        b. Applying risk based oversight processes, behaviors and tools
        within Applicant projects, processes, and procedures. Efficient
        FAA level of project involvement (LOPI) will be determined by a
        risk based oversight model based on observed compliance
        capability of the Applicant (...) with a systems approach that
        incorporates an audit process by the FAA and Holder after the
        completion of the project 
        c. Enable the Applicant's path towards the Applicant Showing
        Only (ASO), state. ... in this role, the FAA accepts the
        Applicant's compliance data as compliant without FAA or designee
        review when the applicant's capability has been determined
        competent by the FAA.

During design and construction of the MAX, the FAA delegated a large
amount of safety assessments to Boeing itself, a practice that had been
standard for years, but several FAA insiders believed the delegation
went too far.[500][221] By 2018, the FAA was letting Boeing certify 96
percent of its own work.[501] Initially, as a new system or a new device
on the amended type certificate, the FAA retained the oversight of MCAS.
However, the FAA later released it to the Boeing Organization
Designation Authorization (ODA) based on comfort level and thorough
examination, Elwell said in March. "We were able to assure that the ODA
members at Boeing had the expertise and the knowledge of the system to
continue going forward."[299]

Recognized civil aviation development practices, such as those of SAE
International ARP4754 and ARP4761, require a safety process with
quantitative assessments of availability, reliability, and integrity,
validation of requirements, and verification of implementation. Such
processes rely on engineering judgment and the application of these
practices varies within the industry.[502][503]

In March 2019, reports emerged that Boeing performed the original System
Safety Analysis, and FAA technical staff felt that managers pressured
them to sign off on it. Boeing managers also pressured engineers to
limit safety testing during the analysis.[253]

On March 6, 2019, four days prior to the Ethiopian crash, Boeing and the
FAA declined to comment regarding their safety analysis of Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) for a story in The Seattle
Times. On March 17, a week after the crash, The Seattle Times published
the following flaws as identified by aviation engineers:[221]

      * The analysis downplayed MCAS's capability of pushing down the
        plane nose to avert a stall;[221]
      * After the Lion Air crash, Boeing released a service bulletin
        informing airlines that the MCAS could deflect the tail in
        increments up to 2.5°, up from the 0.6° told to the FAA in the
        safety assessment;[221]
      * MCAS could reset itself after each pilot response to repeatedly
        pitch the aircraft down;[221]
      * MCAS failure was assessed as "hazardous", one level below
        "catastrophic", but even then it should not rely on a single

In its safety analysis for the 737 MAX, Boeing stated the assumption
that pilots trained on standard Boeing 737 safety procedures should be
able to properly assess contradictory warnings and act effectively
within four seconds.[504]

Problems with the angle-of-attack sensor had been reported in over 200
incident reports submitted to the FAA; however, Boeing did not flight
test a scenario in which it malfunctioned.[505]

The general public and worldwide regulators are concerned by the MAX
grounding; consequently, the FAA is re-evaluating its certification
process. The FAA was seeking consensus with other regulators to approve
the return to service to avoid suspicion of undue cooperation with
Boeing.[506] The International Air Transport Association (IATA) had also
made a similar statement calling for more coordination and consensus
with training and return to service requirements.[507] The FAA does not
have a timetable on when the 737 MAX will return to service,[508]
stating that it is guided by a "thorough process, not a prescribed

In August 2019, reports of friction between Boeing Co. and international
air-safety authorities emerged. A Boeing briefing was stopped short by
the FAA, EASA, and other regulators, who complained that Boeing had
"failed to provide technical details and answer specific questions about
modifications in the operation of MAX flight-control
computers."[510][511] A U.S. official confirmed frustration with some of
Boeing's answers.[300]

On August 22 2019, the FAA announced that it would invite pilots from
around the world, intended to be a representative cross-section of
"ordinary" 737 pilots, to participate in simulator tests as part of the
recertification process, at a date to be determined.[512] The evaluation
group sessions are one of the final steps in the validation of
flight-control computer software updates and will involve around 30
pilots, including some first officers with multi-crew pilot licenses
which emphasize simulator experience rather than flight hours. The FAA
hopes that the feedback from pilots with more varied experience will
enable it to determine more effective training standards for the

On September 18 2019, FAA administrator Steve Dickson (who had succeeded
Daniel Elwell) said that he would not certify the MAX until he flew the
aircraft himself.[514][515]

On October 2 2019, The Seattle Times reported that Boeing convinced FAA
regulators to relax certification requirements in 2014, that would have
added to the development cost to the MAX.[259]

European Aviation Safety Agency[edit]

The EASA and Transport Canada announced they will independently verify
FAA recertification of the 737 MAX.[487][516] 

For product certifications, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
is already in the process of significantly changing its approach to the
definition of Level of Involvement (LoI) with Design Organisations.
Based on an assessment of risk, an applicant makes a proposal for the
Agency's involvement "in the verification of the compliance
demonstration activities and data". EASA considers the applicant's
proposal in determining its LOI.[517][518][519]

In a letter sent to the FAA on April 1 2019, EASA stated four conditions
for recertification: "1. Design changes proposed by Boeing are EASA
approved (no delegation to FAA) 2. Additional and broader independent
design review has been satisfactorily completed by EASA 3. Accidents of
JT610 and ET302 are deemed sufficiently understood 4. B737 MAX flight
crews have been adequately trained."[145]

In a May 22 statement, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
reaffirmed the need to independently certify the 737 MAX software and
pilot training.[520] In addition to system analysis mentioned above,
EASA raised concerns with the autopilot not engaging or disengaging upon
request, or that the manual trim wheel is electronically counteracted
upon, or requires substantial physical force to overcome the aerodynamic
effects in flight.[521] 

In September 2019, the European Union received parliamentary questions
for written answers about the independent testing and re-certification
of critical parts of the Boeing 737 MAX by the EASA:[522]

              * Could the Commission confirm whether these tests will
                extend beyond the MCAS flight software issue to the real
                problem of the aerodynamic instability flaw which the
                MCAS software was created to address?
              * Does the Commission have concerns about the limited
                scope of the FAA's investigation into the fatal loss of
                control, and is EASA basing its re-certification of the
                737 Max on that investigation?
              * What assurances can the Commission give that the de
                facto delegation of critical elements of aircraft
                certification to the same company that designed and
                built the aircraft, and the practice of delegated
                oversight, does not exist in Europe?

EASA stated it was satisfied with changes to the flight control computer
architecture; improved crew procedures and training are considered a
simplification but still work in progress; the integrity of the angle of
attack system is still not appropriately covered by Boeing's response.
The EASA recommends a flight test to evaluate aircraft performance with
and without the MCAS.[523][145][524] EASA said it will send its own test
pilots and engineers to fly certification flight tests of the modified
737 MAX. EASA also said it prefers a design that takes readings from
three independent Angle of Attack sensors.[233] EASA's leaders want
Boeing and the FAA to commit for longer-term safety enhancements.Mr. Ky
is said to seek a third source of the angle of attack. EASA is
comtemplating the installation of a third sensor or equivalent system at
a later stage, once the planes return to service.[247]

Engineering and certification activities for avionics update[edit]

Flight tests[edit]

In early October, CEO Muilenburg said that Boeing's own test pilots had
completed more than 700 flights with the MAX.[247]

Certification flight tests, because of the ongoing safety review, are
unlikely before November.[525]

Safety reviews[edit]

The FAA has identified new risks of failure during thorough testing. As
a result, Boeing will make the overall flight-control computer more
redundant and both computers will operate on each flight instead of
alternating between flights. The planes were said to be unlikely to
resume operations until 2020.[526][527][253] On October 8, Being was
fixing a flaw discovered in the redundant-computer architecture of the
737 MAX flight-control system.[528]

As of October 8[update], the FAA and the EASA were still reviewing
changes to the MAX software, raising questions about the return to
service forecast. The FAA will review Boeing's "final system
description", which specifies the architecture of the flight control
system and the changes that Boeing have made, and perform an "integrated
system safety analysis"; the updated avionics will be assessed for pilot
workload.[529] The FAA is specifically looking at six "non-normal"
checklists that could be resequenced or changed. The assessment of these
checklists with pilots could happen at the end of October, according to
an optimistic forecast.[279]



Boeing initially hoped that flights could resume by July 2019;[530] by
June 3, CEO Dennis Muilenburg expected to have the planes flying by the
end of 2019 but declined to provide a timeline.[531] On July 18, Boeing
reaffirmed Muilenburg's prediction, hoping to return the MAX to flight
during the fourth quarter of 2019. Boeing indicated that this was its
best estimate and that the date could still slip.[532]

In September, Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg stated that the MAX might
return in phases around the world due to the current state of regulatory
divide on approving the airplane.[533] Later that same month Boeing told
its suppliers that the plane could return to service by November.[534]


Airlines individually announced return to service dates to facilitate
flight reservations and scheduling into the future, as groundings have
resulted in route cancellations and postponed retirement of older

In April, Southwest Airlines and American Airlines estimated that
groundings could continue until August 2019.[535] At that stage United
Airlines expected its 737 MAXs to remain grounded until July.[536] Air
Canada, which initially rescheduled its 737 MAXs to July, pushed their
return to August 2019.[537]

On May 24, United Airlines extended scheduled cancellations until August
2019.[538] At the end of May, the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) expected flights to resume in mid-August.[539]

In June, American Airlines,[540] Southwest Airlines[541][373] and United
Airlines[542] all extended their cancellations to September 2 or 3.
Southwest Airlines and United Airlines removed the 737 MAX from their
schedules for another month, until October 2.[543] Emirates chief Sheikh
Ahmed gave the furthest projection that pushed the expected date to
December 2019, for flydubai's 737 MAX operations, he said, due to a lack
of regulator coordination.[544] 

In July, United,[545] American,[546][547][548][549] and Southwest
Airlines[550] further extended their cancellations until the beginning
of November. United Airlines announced that it was purchasing 19 used
737-700s for delivery from December;[551] the airline's fleet plan for
this timeframe had previously targeted 30 MAXs by the end of 2019 and a
further 28 in 2020.[552] Southwest Airlines pulled the planes from its
schedule until January 5, 2020[553][554][555] as well as ceasing all
operations at Newark airport.[367][554] Air Canada extended its
cancellations until January 8, 2020, cutting its overall capacity, and
noted that it could take up to a year to return its 737 MAX fleet to
full service.[556]

In August, American Airlines added some 737 MAX routes to its schedule
for November and December 2019, in anticipation of the aircraft being
returned to service.[557] Icelandair removed the 737 MAX from its
schedule until 2020, not anticipating the aircraft's return to
service.[558] United Airlines removed the 737 MAX from its schedule
until December 19.[559][560][555] American Airlines also removed the
aircraft from its schedule until December 3.[561][555]

By September, no Canadian airlines planned to fly the MAX 8 until at
least 2020.[562] United Airlines and Southwest Airlines announced their
back-to-service policies, allowing passengers who do not feel
comfortable flying on a MAX to be put on another flight if "it's not an
airplane you want to fly on for whatever reason".[563] As of late
September, Ryanair expected flights to resume in either February or
March 2020.[564] Southwest Airlines expects to resume flights 45 to 60
days after the grounding is lifted; pilots estimated that commercial
service might restart between January and March 2020.[565]

On October 9, American Airlines cancelled its MAX flights until January
16, 2020.[566] Air Canada removed 737 MAX flights from its schedule to
January 8, 2020.[567] On October 11, United Airlines cancelled its MAX
flights until January 6, 2020, making the United States the second
country that would not plan to fly the MAX until 2020.[568]


On June 27, Belgium issued a NOTAM prohibiting the 737-8 MAX and -9 MAX
until 2020.[569][importance?]

See also[edit]

      * Qantas Flight 72: spikes in AoA data caused the A330 to pitch
        down, injuring over a hundred passengers.
      * Air France Flight 447: crash of an Airbus A330 in 2009,
        following inconsistent airspeed data, pitot tube failure, and
        resultant loss of automation, with aircraft stalling under pilot
      * Aviacionavion.pngAviation portal


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External links[edit]

      * The real reason Boeing's new plane crashed twice. Vox Videos.
        April 15, 2019.
      * "Timeline: The Boeing 737 MAX Crisis". Aviation Week Network.
        May 16, 2019.
      * Leggett, Theo (May 17, 2019). "What went wrong inside Boeing's
        cockpit?". BBC News Online.
      * Cox, John (May 20, 2019). "This [the emergency the pilots faced]
        is not simple". Leeham News.
      * Gelles, David; Wichter, Zach (July 18, 2019). "Boeing 737 Max:
        The Latest on the Deadly Crashes and the Fallout". The New York
      * Broderick, Sean (August 15, 2019). "The MAX Saga, One Question
        At A Time". Aviation Week & Space Technology.
      * Hemmerdinger, Jon (September 13, 2019). "Six months on from the
        Boeing 737 Max grounding". Flightglobal.
      * "Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System - Observations, Findings,
        and Recommendations" (PDF). Joint Authorities Technical Review.
        October 11, 2019.


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